Atiku Abubakar and Nigeria’s Privatization Legacy: Between Promise and Controversy
By DAYO ADESULU
When former Vice President Atiku Abubakar’s name resurfaces in Nigeria’s political debates, one recurring theme is his association with the country’s privatization programme under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration (1999–2007). For critics, the initiative is seen as a dark mark of corruption, while supporters argue that it was a bold attempt to reform a broken public sector. But what is the truth behind the claims and counterclaims?
The Role Atiku Played
As Vice President, Atiku Abubakar chaired the National Council on Privatization (NCP), the government body tasked with steering the process of selling off state-owned enterprises. This made him the face of the policy, even though the actual work was spread across several agencies, including the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE). Former President Olusegun Obasanjo himself later admitted that Atiku was indeed in charge of the privatization drive during that era.
This much is true: Atiku did not merely play a ceremonial role. He actively pushed policies that aimed to reduce government’s grip on inefficient public corporations, with the hope of opening the economy to private capital and efficiency.
The Companies in Question
One of the most contested claims is whether Atiku successfully privatized big-ticket firms like NITEL (Nigeria Telecommunications Limited), NEPA (National Electric Power Authority), and Nigerian Airways.
The fact is more nuanced. Nigerian Airways was eventually liquidated, but its privatization was messy and left thousands jobless. Attempts to privatize NITEL repeatedly collapsed, with bids either failing or being reversed due to controversy and poor investor performance. NEPA, on the other hand, was unbundled into successor companies as part of reforms, but its full privatization did not happen until after Obasanjo’s government.
Thus, while Atiku presided over the attempts to privatize these firms, it is misleading to say they were fully privatized under his watch.
A Process Dogged by Corruption Allegations
One claim that has held up under scrutiny is that the privatization programme was riddled with corruption, mismanagement, and undervaluation of assets. Independent reports and media investigations from that period repeatedly raised red flags. Companies were sold for figures considered far below their market worth. In some cases, transactions were reversed after complaints of shady practices.
For many Nigerians, the outcome of privatization did not translate into better services or a stronger economy. Instead, it bred a new class of politically connected business elites who scooped up assets.
Success or Failure?
Looking back, the record of the Obasanjo-Atiku privatization programme is mixed at best. While it set the stage for reforms in sectors like banking and power, its poor execution left a bitter taste. For instance, NITEL’s collapse paved the way for private telecom operators like MTN and Glo, but it also represented the waste of a once-proud national asset.
Supporters of Atiku argue that he should be praised for pushing reforms in a country where public enterprises had become a drain on national resources. Detractors counter that the programme he oversaw was a failure, burdened by corruption and poor planning.
The Political Weight of Privatization
More than a decade later, the legacy of privatization remains a double-edged sword for Atiku Abubakar. Each election season, his role resurfaces—sometimes as evidence of his economic boldness, other times as a stain of corruption.
What is clear is that the claims often thrown around in political debates—such as that he fully privatized NITEL or that the process was a roaring success—do not hold up to facts. Atiku was in charge, yes, but the outcomes were far more complex and controversial.
Big background claims
- “Atiku was in charge of the economy and had a free hand until the Galaxy Backbone scandal.” — Mixed.
Atiku did chair the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) and the National Economic Council, key roles for privatisation 1999-2007. But “free hand” over the whole economy is an exaggeration, and the “Galaxy Backbone scandal” wording is misleading—the 2006–2007 fight was largely about alleged misuse of PTDF funds and policy disagreements; Galaxy Backbone itself was a government ICT project used in the political spat, not a proven “scandal” of Atiku’s. WikipediaallAfrica.comVanguard News
Federal Secretariat, Ikoyi (the 15-storey complex)
- “Leased in 2006 to Babalakin’s Resort Ltd on a 99-year Development Lease Agreement for N7.2bn to convert to ~480 luxury apartments; later a court ordered payment of ~N54bn over the stalled deal.” — Mostly true.
A 10 Oct 2006 DLA granted Resort International Ltd (linked to Wale Babalakin) a 99-year lease to redevelop the Ikoyi Federal Secretariat into ~480 flats; Lagos State opposed it. In Dec 2023, Nigeria’s Court of Appeal upheld a judgment awarding about N54bn to Resort over the aborted project (arising from actions under previous administrations). allAfrica.comResearchGateThe Guardian Nigeria
Refineries sale & reversal (May–June 2007)
- “Atiku sold Port Harcourt Refinery to cronies in 2007; President Yar’Adua reversed it.” — Mostly true (with nuance).
In May 2007, the Bluestar Consortium (Dangote/Zenon) bought 51% of Port Harcourt and Kaduna refineries for $561m + $160m; in June 2007 the deal was reversed and the money refunded. The transaction was an FGN/BPE/NCP action at the end of the Obasanjo administration—not literally Atiku acting alone. Facebook
ALSCON (Aluminium Smelter)
- “Built for $3.2bn, sold to RUSAL for $130m; $120m meant for Imo River dredging went missing; Senate queried it in Aug 2011.” — Mixed.
Sale price is disputed: some reputable reports put RUSAL’s 2006 purchase at $130m, others at $250m. The 2011 Senate probe did question the unexecuted $120m dredging funds and took testimony from RUSAL’s deputy MD. So: dredging concern true; exact sale price contested. WikipediaFacebook
NPA & Ports reforms (2004–2006)
- “Reform was to grab properties; 10,000 workers were sacked; many properties auctioned.” — Mixed.
Nigeria concessioned port terminals in 2005–06 and thousands of NPA staff were retrenched—credible reports put it around 8,000–10,000. The specific “133 bids / 68 Apapa / 28 Ikoyi / N390.4m” figures aren’t corroborated by reliable public records I could find. So: large layoffs true; detailed property numbers unverified. World BankWorld Bank Open Data
Nigerian Railway Corporation
- “7,000 workers were sacked in 2005 to cut the workforce to ~6,300; another 1,260 fired in 2006; N5bn pensions unpaid by 2007.” — Mostly true / partly unverified.
In 2005, government indeed approved ~7,000 NRC retrenchments, leaving ~6,400 staff. I couldn’t locate reliable documentation for the exact ‘1,260’ in 2006 or the N5bn arrears figure. allAfrica.com
Nigerdock
- “Atiku ignored the Transport Ministry; preferred bidder ‘Global Energy’ promised to raise staff to 6,000 but sacked thousands; Jagal later took over.” — Mixed.
Records show Global Energy/J. Ray McDermott emerged preferred bidder in 2001; there were compliance/payment disputes, and Jagal ultimately became core investor. The specific workforce promises and sack counts aren’t corroborated in dependable sources. allAfrica.comNairaland
NITEL / NECOM House
- “NITEL was sold for peanuts and killed to benefit MTN/Glo/Airtel; NITEL House on Marina was sold cheap to a former Speaker.” — Misleading / Partly false.
NITEL had multiple failed transactions (Pentascope management 2003; Transcorp acquisition in 2006 later revoked in 2009; eventual sale to NATCOM in 2015). The “sold to benefit competitors” is speculative. NECOM House (ex-NITEL HQ) was sold by the NITEL Pension Fund to a company linked to Alani Bankole (father of ex-Speaker Dimeji Bankole)—not to the Speaker himself. allAfrica.com
Nigeria Airways & assets
- “What happened to Nigeria Airways and its GRA Ikeja houses?” — Directionally true but vague.
Nigeria Airways was liquidated in the early 2000s and assets were disposed; employees battled over severance for years. The write-up’s rhetorical questions don’t contain specific, checkable claims.
Nigeria Reinsurance & NICON Insurance
- “Who bought Nigeria Re? Who bought NICON Insurance?” — True (as to buyers).
Both were privatised mid-2000s, acquired by Jimoh Ibrahim’s Global Fleet/related entities; AMCON later took them into receivership amid massive debt disputes. ProSharethewhistler.ngThe Nation Newspaper
Transcorp Hilton (Abuja) / NICON Luxury (Abuja)
- “To whom did Atiku sell Transcorp Hilton and NICON Luxury?” — Mostly true on buyers; note the structure.
In Dec 2005, FGN (via BPE) sold 51% of NIRMSCO (owner of the then Nicon-Hilton Abuja) to a consortium led by Transcorp, which became the core investor; FGN retained 49%. NICON Luxury Abuja was acquired by Jimoh Ibrahim around the same era. These were BPE/NCP-managed deals, not personal sales by Atiku. NairametricsWikipedia
Eleme Petrochemicals & NAFCON (Onne)
- “Eleme Petrochemicals sold to Indorama; FG’s extra 5% wasn’t presented to NCP; Indorama recouped $27m in 14 months.” — Partly true / partly unsubstantiated.
Indorama acquired a 65% stake in Eleme Petrochemicals in 2006; that portion is well-documented. The precise claim about an unpresented 5% and exact $27m recouped in 14 months isn’t verifiable from high-quality public sources. - “NAFCON (fertilizer) buyer?” — True.
Notore Chemical Industries acquired the Onne plant mid-2000s after privatisation. WikipediaThe Guardian Nigeria
Ughelli & Egbin power plants
- “To whom did Atiku sell Ughelli Power and Egbin Power?” — False (re: Atiku era).
Those big generation assets were privatised in 2013 (Goodluck Jonathan era): Transcorp bought Ughelli, and Sahara/KEPCO took Egbin. Not during 1999-2007. Businessday NGFacebook
Bacita Sugar, Sunti Sugar, MM2, Daily Times, etc.
- “Bacita Sugar (Nigerian Sugar Co.) sale?” — True (buyer).
Josepdam acquired Bacita/NISUCO in 2006 via BPE. ProShare - “Sunti Sugar Ltd?” — Not an Atiku-era sale.
The Sunti (Niger State) sugar estate sits with Flour Mills of Nigeria (Sunti Golden Sugar) through investments post-2009/2010—not a 1999-2007 privatisation. (No credible evidence it was “sold by Atiku”.) - “MM2 (Murtala Muhammed Airport Terminal 2).” — Misframed.
MM2 was a BOT concession to Bi-Courtney signed in 2003, not an outright sale. Facebook - “Daily Times.” — True (buyer).
Sold by BPE to Folio Communications in 2004. NNSL Online Archive
Onigbolo Cement (Benin–Nigeria bi-national plant)
- “Sold in 2007 to Dangote for N1.7bn.” — False.
The Republic of Benin privatised Onigbolo later; Dangote acquired 43% in 2010, not 2007; the “N1.7bn” figure doesn’t match reliable reporting. Vanguard News
Poverty, GDP, life expectancy, textiles (the 2002 snapshot)
- “Manufacturing was 6% of GDP in 2002; GDP fell by half; all textile factories closed; unemployment 28%.” — False / Unsupported.
World Bank data show manufacturing ~11–12% of GDP in 2002, and GDP did not halve in 2002; it grew in the early 2000s. The “all textiles closed” and “28% formal unemployment” claims aren’t supported by credible official data. - “UN said 70% of Nigerians were poor in 2002 (vs 48.5% in 1998); life expectancy fell from 54 to 51; only 50% had clean water; two-fifths of under-fives malnourished.” — Mostly false / imprecise.
The 2003/04 NLSS/World Bank put national poverty around 54%, not 70% in 2002; 1998 poverty at 48.5% is also inconsistent with 1996/2004 series. Life expectancy figures given (54→51) don’t match World Bank (Nigeria was mid-40s years then). The water/malnutrition numbers may be in the ballpark of some older surveys, but I couldn’t tie them to 2002 UN documentation as phrased. World Bank Open DataWikipedia
$16bn power spending under Obasanjo
- “Obasanjo/Atiku era spent $16bn on power with little to show.” — Partly true (probe & controversy are real).
The House of Reps 2008 probe flagged colossal waste in power spending (often cited as $13–16bn) and recommended further investigation of officials; the matter has been politically contested ever since. It’s fair to say much was spent with poor outcomes; firm criminal findings against specific individuals have been harder. NairametricsPremium Times NigeriaPunch Nigeria
Mikano generators
- “Atiku’s Mikano Generators power Nigeria.” — False.
Mikano International is owned by Mofid Karameh (Lebanese-Nigerian business family). There’s no credible evidence Atiku owns Mikano.
National Shipping Line (NNSL)
- “Ships disappeared 1999–2015.” — False (on timing).
NNSL was liquidated in 1995, before the 1999 civilian administration; a smaller successor (National Unity Line) followed. Tribune Online
Quick answers to the “who bought what?” list (where verifiable)
- NAFCON (Onne) → Notore (mid-2000s). Wikipedia
- Eleme Petrochemicals → Indorama (65% in 2006). The Guardian Nigeria
- Daily Times → Folio Communications (2004). NNSL Online Archive
- Ughelli Power → Transcorp (2013; not Atiku era). Businessday NG
- Egbin Power → Sahara/KEPCO (2013; not Atiku era). Facebook
- NICON Insurance / Nigeria Re → Global Fleet/Jimoh Ibrahim (mid-2000s). ProShare
- ALSCON → RUSAL (2006; price disputed: $130m vs $250m). WikipediaFacebook
- Transcorp Hilton, Abuja (NIRMSCO) → Transcorp-led consortium (51%) in 2005; FGN kept 49%. Nairametrics
- NICON Luxury, Abuja → Jimoh Ibrahim interests (mid-2000s). ProShare
- Bacita Sugar (NISUCO) → Josepdam (2006). ProShare
- Sunti Sugar → Flour Mills of Nigeria (later investment); not a 1999-2007 BPE sale.
- MM2 (Lagos) → Bi-Courtney BOT concession (2003), not a sale. Facebook
Conclusion
Atiku Abubakar’s record on privatization highlights the challenges of reforming Nigeria’s economy. It was a programme full of ambition but crippled by mismanagement and lack of transparency. The story of Nigeria’s privatization under Obasanjo and Atiku is not one of outright success or failure, but rather a cautionary tale of how policy execution can make or break reform.
